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The Timber Harvest Plan Exemption from
the California Environmental Quality




We know, above all, that to use the term "old-growth forest" does not
really convey the depth and power of our feelings or our love. It does
not convey what it is like to walk through a great aisle of forest giants
early on a summer morning, the ground still damp, dew still on the
ferns, golden bars of sunlight slanting and streaming through the arms
of each tree, touching the park-like ground, like the fingers of God.
This is a spiritual experience and a spiritual resource, as well as an
economic and wildlife resource.'
The Pacific Lumber Company was long commended for its environ-
mentally sound approach to harvesting timber.2 Yet, shortly after Max-
xam Corporation took the helm of the company after a hostile corporate
takeover in 1985, 3 the company's environmentally sensitive approach
was traded for one that doubled the rate at which company trees are cut
and which began to include clear-cutting of old-growth forest.4 Max-
xam's method of timber harvesting will have a drastic cumulative effect
on the environment, causing irreparable harm to dependent species such
as the spotted owl,5 and destroying watershed resources. 6
* B.A. 1984, Antioch University West; Member, Third Year Class.
1. Evans, Ancient Treasures: Old Growth, History, and Heritage, 2 J. ENVTL. L. Lrr-
GATION 141, 142 (1987).
2. Tall Timber Tension: The Redwoods Meet the Law, Natl L. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 1, col.
1, and at 24, col. 3 ("Other lumber companies stripped and sold their redwood and fir in cycles
of boom and bust. In contrast, Pacific Lumber operated as if the Sierra Club were in charge.").
3. Id at 24, col. 1.
4. Id
5. See Declaration of Paul R. Ehrlich, Bing Professor of Population Studies in the De-
partment of Biological Sciences at Stanford University, filed in case No. 81790, Superior Court
of California, County of Humboldt, on November 14, 1988. Professor Ehrlich states "[t]he
single human activity that most threatens species the world around is the cutting down of
forests." Id at 2. "[P]ast logging of old forest that provides habitat for the northern spotted
owl has jeopardized the continued existence of this bird. Further harvesting of old forest in-
creases the risk of extinction and reduces the management options available for protect[ion]."
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Citizens who wish to stop the loss of nonrenewable resources have
found that the most successful avenue of attack is environmental litiga-
tion. Interested citizens and citizen action groups have brought many
cases against corporations such as Maxxam. When the threatened spe-
cies or resources are located in California, these groups frequently use
the California Environmental Quality Act as their vehicle for relief.7
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was enacted by
the California Legislature in 1970. 8 The overriding legislative intent of
CEQA is to maintain a "quality environment for the people of this state
now and in the future."9 The preservation of such an environment is "a
matter of statewide concern." 0 To meet this public policy, CEQA re-
quires that the "long-term protection of the environment.., be the guid-
ing criterion in public decisions.""
An environmental impact report (EIR) is the major method em-
ployed by CEQA to determine the impact a proposed project will have
on the environment, and whether or not there are available methods to
mitigate its adverse effects. 12 An EIR is considered to be the "heart of
the environmental control process."' 13 Timber harvesting operations on
private lands in California, however, are exempt from CEQA's environ-
mental impact report requirement. 14 Instead, these operations must file
Id. at 3. See also Declaration of Russell Lande, Associate Professor in the Department of
Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago, filed in case No. 81790, Superior Court of
California, County of Humboldt, on November 14, 1988:
[M]y own work as well as the work of other reputable scientists who have studied the
spotted owl, indicates that the most responsible scientific opinion based on available
data is that the Northern Spotted Owl is threatened with extinction by ongoing log-
ging of its habitat, the old forests of the Pacific Northwest.
Id. at 3. (Copies of these documents are on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
6. This information was provided during a telephone conversation with Thomas Lippe
(Jan. 23, 1989). Mr. Lippe, a San Francisco attorney who represents California litigants in
efforts to save lands from clear cutting, states that clear cutting along the northern California
coast will cause irreparable harm to the Big River drainage and estuary.
7. Tall Timber, supra note 2, at 27, col. 1 & 2.
8. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). The legislature
also mandated the promulgation of administrative regulations for the implementation of
CEQA, CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15000-15387 (1983).
9. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000(a) (West 1986).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 21001(d).
12. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15003(b)-(d) (1983).
13. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 192, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396,
401 (1977); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15003(a) (1983).
14. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 14, § 15251(a) (1983).
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timber harvest plans that should address both the broad environmental
concerns1 5 and the substantive standards16 of CEQA.
Traditionally, timber harvest plans have been required to harmonize
with the overall intent of CEQA. This means that participants in the
timber harvest plan process must meet the substantive requirements of
CEQA. Because CEQA's substantive requirements are to protect the en-
vironment and involve the public in governmental decisionmaking in this
regard, 17 procedural deviations are exempt only if they continue to meet
the overall intent of CEQA. Timber harvest plans, thus, should be ex-
empt only to the extent their implementation meets the purpose of
CEQA. 18
There is an alarming discrepancy, however, between CEQA and the
procedures under which timber harvest plans operate. CEQA requires
that members of the public receive notice and have an opportunity to be
heard regarding all comments prior to the commencement of an ap-
proved project. Yet, the rules governing the procedural approach to tim-
ber harvest plans' 9 permit logging to commence immediately after a
timber harvest plan has been approved. These rules allow logging to be-
gin before the public either is notified of such approval or given the op-
portunity to appeal such approval. This procedure has been challenged
as violating the United States and California constitutional requirements
of due process of law, 20 as well as the overall intent of CEQA.21
A recent Sixth District of California appellate opinion, Laupheimer
v. State,22 concluded that the California Administrative Code's proce-
dural rules (under which the timber harvest plan operates) "are adequate
as a matter of procedural due process."'23 The spirit of this decision is
contrary to the First Appellate District's reasoning in Environmental
15. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 1986).
16. Laupheimer v. State, 200 Cal. App. 3d 440, 462, 246 Cal. Rptr. 82, 93 (1988); Envi-
ronmental Protection Information Center v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 604, 620, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 502, 512 (1985); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001 (West 1986).
17. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(a), (b) (West 1986).
18. Id. § 21080.5(d)(3).
19. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 895-1112 (1989).
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7, subd. (a); See Laupheimer,
200 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 89; Environmental Protection Information Center,
170 Cal. App. 3d at 608, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
21. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000, 21001 (West 1986). One of the major purposes of
CEQA is to encourage public involvement. Laupheimer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 458, 246 Cal.
Rptr. at 90, Environmental Protection Information Center, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 610, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 505.
22. 200 Cal. App. 3d 440, 246 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1988).
23. Ia at 457, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
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Protection Information Center v. Johnson,24 which held that the Forest
Practice Rules are not a blanket exemption to CEQA 25 and must comply
with the overriding intent of CEQA. EPIC further held that the "pub-
lic's interest in the forest resources and timberlands [in California] has
been described as fundamental. ' 26 The public's fundamental interest in
forest resources together with the statutory right to a hearing provided
by CEQA makes denial of that hearing a deprivation of due process of
law.
The Laupheimer decision appears to meet with the constitutional
due process standards set by the United States Supreme Court in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge.27 It does not, however, meet the stricter scrutiny re-
quired by the California Constitution, as set forth in People v. Ramirez.28
This Note argues that Laupheimer does not meet California constitu-
tional standards and is limited to its facts.
Section I of this Note sets forth the procedural requirements of
CEQA and the Forest Practices Act, and examines their similarities and
differences. Section II shows that the timber harvest plan is required to
operate within the substantive scope of CEQA and examines the inter-
play between the two operative acts. Section III demonstrates that tradi-
tional judicial interpretation of comparable statutory schemes
emphasizes that Laupheimer was decided incorrectly and that the timber
harvest plan must fully comply with California due process require-
ments, as set forth by the California Constitution, the judiciary, and the
legislature. Finally, section IV sets forth a proposal that the California
Legislature amend the timber harvest plan to require that an official envi-
ronmental response stating all grounds for timber harvest plan approval
be issued to the public before logging is allowed to commence.
I. The California Environmental Quality Act and the Timber
Harvest Plan Exemption
It is well-established California policy to provide long-term protec-
tion for the environment. 29 The California Legislature enacted CEQA to
monitor government activities that would have any significant effect on
24. Environmental Protection Information Center, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 621-24, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 513-15; see infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 616-18, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 509-11.
26. Id. at 623, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
27. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (government benefits may be terminated without a prior eviden-
tiary hearing if a three-part balancing test is met).
28. 25 Cal. 3d 260, 286, 599 P.2d 622, 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (1979) ("freedom
from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of one's liberty").
29. CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE § 21001 (West 1986).
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the environment.30 CEQA is a complex statutory system setting forth
detailed procedural requirements that must be followed to meet its sub-
stantive purposes. A brief description of how CEQA works is necessary
to understand how the timber harvest plan exemption fits within the stat-
utory scheme.
A. How CEQA Works
The California Environmental Quality Act applies to all govern-
mental actions 31 that will have a "significant effect" 32 on the environ-
ment. Its purpose is not only to protect the environment, but also to
inform the public, 33 so that the public may respond to any governmental
action with which it disagrees.34 As a result, CEQA is a powerful tool
for citizen action and governmental accountability.
To meet these substantive goals, the act sets forth procedures to be
followed by state and local agencies35 in their efforts to ensure that any
project having a potentially significant adverse effect on the environ-
ment 36 will be ameliorated. To achieve these objectives, the legislature
requires that the "lead agency" 37 determine whether a project will have a
significant environmental impact.
30. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
31. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15002(b)-(c) (1983) distinguish between governmental
action and private actions. "A private action is not subject to CEQA unless the action involves
governmental participation, financing, or approval." See also Friends of Mammoth v. Board
of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). Mammoth was the
first California Supreme Court decision to interpret CEQA and held that environmental analy-
sis is required for agency actions such as permits, leases, and other entitlements, taken in
response to private initiatives. Id at 262, 502 P.2d 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. 771; S. DUGGAN, J.G.
MOOSE & T. THOMAS, GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AcT
(CEQA) 6 (2nd ed. 1988) (GUIDE TO CEQA).
32. "Significant effect" is a "substantial or potentially substantial, adverse change in the
environment." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21068 (West 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§ 15064 (1983).
33. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 391,
764 P.2d 278, 282, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 430 (1988); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d
795, 808, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386 (1973); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15003(b), (c) (1983).
34. People v. County. of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 842, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75 (1974);
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15003(e) (1983).
35. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15368 (1983) defines local agency as "any public
agency other than a state agency, board, or commission."
36. "Environment" is defined by CEQA to mean "the physical conditions which exist
within the area which will be affected by a proposed project, including land, air, water, miner-
als, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21060.5 (West 1986).
37. A "lead agency" is the agency that has principal responsibility for approving or car-
rying out a project. Id § 21067; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15367 (1983).
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If the project will not have a significant effect on the environment,
the lead agency must prepare and issue a negative declaration. 38 If the
lead agency determines the project will have a significant effect on the
environment,39 it must file an environmental impact report. 4° The lead
agency's determination regarding the negative declaration or EIR is con-
clusive on all persons and responsible agencies unless challenged within a
short statute of limitations.4 1
38. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080(c) (West 1986). A negative declaration is a written
statement setting forth the reasons a proposed project will not have a significant effect on the
environment and therefore does not require the preparation of an EIR. Id. § 21064; CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15371. The negative declaration process is set forth in sections 15070-
15075 of title 14 of the California Administrative Code. While the time period for public
review of final EIRs is limited to 30 days, see infra note 65, the time period for negative
declarations "shall be a reasonable period of time sufficient to allow members of the public to
respond to the proposed finding before the negative declaration is approved." CAL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 14, § 15105(b) (1982).
39. The CEQA Guidelines state:
(a) A proposed project has the potential to degrade the quality of the environment,
curtail the range of the environment, or to achieve short-term, to the disadvantage of
long-term, environmental goals.
(b) The possible effects of a project are individually limited but cumulatively consid-
erable. As used in this subdivision, "cumulatively considerable" means that the in-
cremental effects of an individual project are considerable when viewed in connection
with the effects of past projects, the effects of other current projects, and the effects of
probable future projects.
(c) The environmental effects of a project will cause substantial adverse effects on
human beings, either directly or indirectly.
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.1 (West 1986); see also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15358
(1983) (clarifying the meaning of "impact" and "effect" as specified in CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21080.5(d)(2)-(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989)).
40. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21165 (West 1986). An environmental impact report is a
detailed statement prepared (or caused to be prepared) by the lead agency. Id. § 21061; CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15362 (1982). The EIR discusses the significant environmental effects
of the proposed project, including proposed mitigation measures, as well as any significant
effects on the environment that cannot be avoided if the project is implemented. The EIR also
sets forth alternatives to the proposed project, the relationship between local short-term uses of
the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, any irre-
versible significant environmental changes that would occur if the project is implemented, and
the growth-inducing impact of the proposed project. The EIR must also include a brief state-
ment indicating the reasons for determining that various effects of a project are not substantial
and consequently have not been discussed in detail. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West
1986). Section 21100.1 of the California Public Resources Code sets forth limits to the EIR
requirement. The EIR process is set forth in sections 15080-15096 of title 14 of the California
Administrative Code.
An EIR is not required for projects that are categorically or statutorily exempt. See infra
notes 68-71 and accompanying text; see also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15300-15329 for
categorical exemptions.
41. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.1 (West 1986) refers challenges to § 21167 for chal-
lenge procedures. The statute of limitations for challenges to the approval of projects governed
by CEQA is quite short. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15112(a) (1978).
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(1) Environmental Impact Report
An EIR is a document informing public agency decisionmakers and
the general public of a project's significant environmental effects. 42 The
EIR identifies possible ways to minimize significant effects, and describes
reasonable alternatives to the project,43 including the alternative of not
moving forward, with it."4 The information contained in the EIR does
not control the agency's ultimate discretion on the project; however, the
agency must respond in writing to all comments on environmental issues
received,45 as well as respond to each significant effect identified in the
EIR,4 6 by making written findings and including the rationale for each
finding.47 An EIR has been described as an "environmental 'alarm bell'
whose purpose is to alert the public and its responsible officials to envi-
ronmental changes before they have reached ecological points of no
return."
48
In preparing the EIR, the lead agency consults with and obtains
comments from each responsible agency.49 The EIR may include com-
ments elicited from "any person who has special expertise with respect to
the environmental impact involved." 50
The public is encouraged to be involved throughout the process of
determining the significance of a proposed project's effect on the environ-
ment.51 The legislature expressly stated that "[e]very citizen has a re-
sponsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
42. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21061 (West 1986).
43. Ia& § 21002.1(a); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15121(a) (1983). The procedures es-
tablishing the content requirements of EIRs generally are set forth at §§ 15120-15132.
44. Referred to as the "no project alternative." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§ 15126(d)(2) (1983) ("The specific alternative of 'no project' shall also be evaluated along
with the impact.").
45. Id. § 15088(a) (1982).
46. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15121(b).
47. Id. § 15091.
48. Santiago County Water Dist. v. County of Orange, 118 Cal. App. 3d 818, 822, 173
Cal. Rptr. 603, 603-04 (1981); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 810, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 388 (1973) (emphasis added).
49. A "responsible agency" is an agency that will undertake or approve a specific project,
but is not the lead agency for the project. The term includes all public agencies other than the
lead agency that has approval power over the project. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21069 (West
1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15381 (1986). While a lead agency must consider both
the individual and collective effects of all activities involved in a project, a "responsible
agency" need only consider the effects of those activities involved in the project that it must
carry out or approve. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21002.1(d) (West 1986). A responsible
agency's role in the EIR process is set forth in CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15096 (1986).
50. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21153 (West 1986).
51. Id. §§ 21000(e), 21003.1(a); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15044 (1986).
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environment. ' 52 One way of contributing to this goal is to take an active
role in the EIR process. Public agencies and members of the public may
comment on the environmental effects of a proposed project at any time
during the EIR process. 53 Such comments assist the lead agency in as-
sessing the environmental effects of a project, potential significant effects,
alternatives, and mitigation measures that may substantially reduce the
effects. 54
As soon as a draft EIR is complete, a notice of completion must be
filed with the Office of Planning and Research.55 Notice must also be
given to all organizations and individuals who have previously requested
notice, as well as to contiguous land owners.56 The public agency must
publish the notice in a paper of general circulation in the area of the
proposed project, and post the notice on and off site. 57 The EIR is then
available for public review and comments for a period of thirty to ninety
days.5 8  Public hearings on the environmental documents are
encouraged. 59
The lead agency is required to respond in writing to all comments
received during the noticed comment period. 6° The written response
must describe the disposition of any significant environmental issues in
detail, with a "good faith, reasoned analysis" as to why the lead agency's
recommendation is at variance with the comments. 61 The CEQA re-
quirement that lead agencies respond in writing to all public comments is
significant. This process gives the public and agencies notice of grounds
52. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000(e) (West 1986) (emphasis added). See also County of
Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 198, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396, 405 (1977) (one
purpose of CEQA is to assure general public input both in the formulation of the EIR and in
the ultimate governmental decision).
53. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21003.1(a) (West 1986).
54. Id.
55. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15023(g) (1986) (the Office of Planning and Research
makes recommendations to the Secretary of Resources regarding adoption, amendment, or
repeal of categorical exemptions); id. § 15085(a)-(b).
56. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21092, 21161 (West 1986).
57. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15087(a) (1986).
58. Referred to as the "noticed comment period." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§§ 15087(c), 15105(a) (1986).
59. Id. § 15087(g). An agency must provide the public with a review period that will
adequately permit public response to the proposed finding that the project will produce no
significant adverse environmental impacts before a negative declaration is adopted. Id.
§ 15073(a).
60. CAL. PUB. REs CODE §§ 21104, 21153 (West 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§ 15088(a)-(b) (1986).
61. CAL. PUB. REs CODE §§ 21104, 21153 (West 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§ 15088(b) (1986).
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for project approval and provides grounds that create'a basis upon which
judicial review of the action may be obtained.
Finally, after public comments have been responded to, an EIR goes
into final form and is ready to be certified by the lead agency. 62 Before a
project can be approved, the EIR must be considered and certified by the
decisionmaking body of the lead agency,63 which considers the EIR in
conjunction with the required findings. 64 The lead agency must file a
notice of determination for all approved projects for which an EIR was
considered, 65 at which point a thirty-day statute of limitations on court
challenges to the approved project begins to run.66 The public not only is
encouraged to participate throughout the EIR process, but the statutes
expressly provide the public with an opportunity to challenge a lead
agency's finding.67
B. The Timber Harvest Plan is Exempt From Filing Environmental Impact
Reports
The lead agency overseeing an EIR is required to complete and cer-
tify the final EIR68 within one year from the date the lead agency ac-
cepted the application as complete.69 Public policy, however, demands
that some projects be expedited through this time-consuming process.
The California Legislature has provided for the Secretary of Resources to
certify certain regulatory programs of a state agency as exempt from the
EIR requirement.70 For a program to be certified, it must be governed
62. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit 14, § 15090 (1986).
63. Id § 15090.
64. Id. §§ 15090-15092.
65. Id § 15094(a).
66. Id § 15094(d); CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21167(b) (West 1986); cf Citizens of Lake
Murray Area Ass'n v. City Council, 129 Cal. App. 3d 436, 440-41, 181 Cal. Rptr. 123, 126
(1982) (the thirty-day statute of limitations on court challenges does not begin to run."until the
day the notice is posted in the office of the county clerk").
67. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15112(c), sets forth CEQA's "unusually short" statute
of limitations. Id at § 15112(a).
68. Id. § 15090.
69. Id § 15108. See also Bendix, A Short Introduction to the California Environmental
Quality Act, 19 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 521, 539 (1979); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15100-
15108 (1983) (setting forth the permissible time periods plus length and availability of exten-
sions). It should be noted that certain projects are not deemed received for filing until suffi-
cient environmental documentation has been completed to permit the CEQA process to be
completed during this short time period. Id. § 15111. The timber harvest plan is not one of
these projects.
70. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21080.5(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). The programs are
further set forth in the CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15251-15253 (1983).
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by rules and regulations that conform to the exemption standards set out
in CEQA.71
The regulatory program for the approval of timber harvest opera-
tions on private lands in California has been certified by the Secretary of
Resources and is exempt from the EIR requirement.72 Timber harvest
plan operations may be approved by applying to the California Depart-
ment of Forestry for a timber harvest plan.7 3
A timber harvest plan is provided for by the legislature and is imple-
mented and controlled under the auspices of a related act, 74 the Z'berg-
Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (FPA),75 which was established to
regulate California timberlands. The express intent of the FPA is to
"create and maintain an effective and comprehensive system of regula-
tion and use of all timberlands" 76 assuring that timberland productivity
is "restored, enhanced, and maintained."'77 At the same time, considera-
tion is given to "recreation, watershed, wildlife, range and forage, fisher-
ies, and aesthetic enjoyment. 78 The California Department of Forestry
implements the FPA79 under procedures set forth in the Forest Practice
Rules.80
71. A certifiable agency's rules and regulations are exempt from the EIR requirement if
they: (1) require that no project shall be approved if there are feasible alternatives or mitiga-
tion measures available that would substantially lessen any adverse impact on the environ-
ment, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.5(d)(2)(i); (2) include guidelines for the preparation of
the project plan and for its evaluation "consistent with the environmental protection purposes
of the regulatory program," id. § 21080.5(d)(2)(ii); (3) require the agency to "consult with all
public agencies which have jurisdiction, by law, with respect to the proposed activity," id.
§ 21080.5(d)(2)(ii); (4) "[r]equire that final action on the proposed activity include the written
responses of the issuing authority to significant environmental points raised during the evalua-
tion process," id. § 21080.5(d)(2)(iv); (5) require notice of the administering agency's decision
be filed with the Secretary of Resources, who is to make it available for public inspection and
post it for 30 days, id. § 21080.5(d)(2)(v); and, (6) "[r]equire the notice of the filing of the plan
or other written documentation to be made to the public and to any person who requests, in
writing, notification. The notification shall be made in a manner that will provide the public or
any person requesting notification with sufficient time to review and comment on the filing."
Id. § 21080.5(d)(2)(vi).
72. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit 14, § 15251(a) (1983).
73. Id. § 15121(a) (1983).
74. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
75. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 4511-4628 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
76. Id. § 4513 (West 1986).
77. Id. § 4513(a).
78. Id. §§ 4513(b), 4512(c).
79. Id. § 4511; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15250(a) (1989).
80. The rules under which the California Department of Forestry implements the FPA
are set forth at sections 895-1112 of title 14 of the California Administrative Code. The Forest
Practice Rules regulate timber harvest plans. Id. § 15251(e) (1989).
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To obtain a license to harvest timber, 81 a timber harvest plan pre-
pired by a Registered Professional Forester82 must be filed with the Cali-
fornia Department of Forestry.8 3 The State Board of Forestry is the
section within the California Department of Forestry, that makes recom-
mendations regarding implementation of timber harvest plans to the Di-
rector of Forestry. The Director controls the notice to the public of the
plan, responds to comments on the plan, and has the last word on licens-
ing.84 Because the timber harvest licensing process has been certified by
the Secretary of Resources as exempt from the EIR requirement, 85 an
EIR need not be prepared; rather, a timber harvest plan analogous to an
EIR must be prepared.
Though narrower in scope than an EIR, the purpose of a timber
harvest plan is to identify the proposed harvest plan, provide public and
governmental decisionmakers with detailed information on the project's
likely effect on the environment, describe ways of minimizing the signifi-
cant effects, and point out any less environmentally destructive alterna-
tives to or mitigation measures for the project.8 6 Thus, one might view a
timber harvest plan as at the "heart of the environmental review pro-
cess" 87 in determining the significant environmental impact of harvesting
timber. Because of the interplay between CEQA and the FPA, an ade-
quate project description necessarily includes identification of all signifi-
cant impacts of a project, possible mitigation measures, and responses to
any comments that the Board of the Department of Forestry does not
deem significant enough to block the project.
C. Similarities and Differences Between ElRs and Timber Harvest Plans
Both an EIR and a timber harvest plan share the elementary re-
quirement that the lead agency determine whether a project will have a
81. Section 4571 of the California Public Resources Code requires that a license be issued
prior to commencement of timber harvesting.
82. MaT § 4581 (West 1986). The Registered Professional Forester who prepares the tim-
ber harvest plan must personally inspect the plan area before submitting the timber harvest
plan. Id. § 4582(h) (West Supp. 1989).
83. Id. § 4581.
84. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 895-903.2 (1986).
85. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
14, § 15251(a) (1983).
86. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.5 (West Supp. 1987). Cf County of Inyo v. City of
Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 193, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396, 401 (1977) ("an accurate, stable
and finite project description is the sine qua non of an informative and legally sufficient EIR.").
87. See supra notes 13 & 48 and accompanying text.
March 1990]
significant adverse effect on the environment.8 8 In addition, both the
EIR and the timber harvest plan require implementation of all feasible
mitigation measures and alternatives to reduce substantially significant
adverse effects. 89
Courts have held that, as with EIRs,90 public participation should
be encouraged throughout the timber harvest plan process. 91 There is a
vast difference, however, between how an EIR is made known to the
public92 and the way in which a timber harvest plan becomes available
for public review. For example, while all contiguous landowners must
receive notice that an EIR has been filed,93 a notice of intent, the docu-
ment that alerts the public that a timber harvest plan has been proposed,
must be filed with the plan only if (1) the proposed plan boundary lies
within 300 feet of any property owned by any person other than the plan
submitter; (2) the plan changes a boundary so that it fits within (1); or (3)
if a plan amendment changes the harvesting method and a notice of in-
tent was required under (1) or (2).94
Only if a plan fits within this tight framework must a notice of intent
be filed. Distribution requirements of the notice are also far less rigorous
than those applicable to EIRs. The Director need only distribute to
those persons holding title to property within 300 feet of the proposed
plan's boundary, 95 to the County Clerk and local ranger unit headquar-
ters for posting,96 and to "such other locations as the Director may deem
desirable and feasible to provide adequate public notice."' 97 A notice of
an EIR, however, must not only be directly distributed to interested indi-
88. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21002, 21002.1 (West 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§§ 898, 898.1 (1988).
89. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21002 (West 1986) ("The Legislature finds and declares that
it is the policy of the State that public agencies should not approve projects as proposed if there
are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which would substantially
lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects .. "); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,
§ 898 (1986).
90. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15201 (1986) ("Public participation is an essential part
of the CEQA process."). See also supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
91. "The public's input into the plan approval process is mandated by law and supported
by strong public policy." Environmental Protection Information Center v. Johnson, 170 Cal.
App. 3d 604, 622 n.10, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502, 513, n.10 (1985).
92. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text
93. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15087(a)(3) (1986).
94. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 1032.7(c) (1982).
95. Id. § 1032.7(f). Note that the addresses of the property owners are to be supplied by
the plan submitter. Id. § 1032.7(e).
96. Id. § 1032.8(a), (b).
97. Id. § 1032.8(c).
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viduals and organizations, but it also must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation. 98
Further, if the Director does not deem other locations-such as a
public paper of general distribution99-"desirable and feasible to provide
adequate public notice,"'1'0 only landowners within 300 feet of the pro-
posed plan's boundary and those members of the public who know to
check the County Clerk's or Ranger Unit's regular place of posting will
have adequate notice of the intent to harvest timber. The tremendous
discrepancy between requiring public participation and making it diffi-
cult to receive notice of an event that the public might want to partici-
pate in should be addressed by the legislature.
The EIR Guidelines require that the lead agency respond to any
comments made by the public by including in the final EIR, "a statement
briefly indicating the reasons for determining that various effects of a
project are not significant and consequently have not been discussed in
detail."101 As'one court observed, "the written response is a keystone to
the public's participation in the approval process, and an important ele-
ment in the public's right to prepare and file a challenge within the maxi-
mum time allowed under the rules." 102
The major distinctions in the process by which responses are made
to the EIR and timber harvest plans result in far different implementa-
tion of the two acts. CEQA and its related rules require that written
responses be made to "each significant effect identified in the EIR,"10 3
including a rationale for permitting a project that is "supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record."' 4 The lead agency must consider the
EIR in conjunction with any rationale for continuing with the project in
spite of the significant effect on the environment and include these rea-
sons in the record of project approval and the notice of determination.10 5
Further, "[a]n EIR shall contain a statement briefly indicating the rea-
sons that various possible significant effects of a project were determined
98. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
99. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21092(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
100. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 1032.8(c) (1982).
101. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15126(a)
("Direct and indirect significant effects of the project on the environment shall be clearly iden-
tified and described, giving due consideration to both the short-term and the long-term
effects.").
102. Environmental Protection Information Center, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 622, n.10, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 513, n.10.
103. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15121(b) (1983) (emphasis added).
104. Id. § 15091(a)(1), (2), (3) & (b) (1986).
105. Id §§ 15092-15094.
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not to be significant and were therefore not discussed in detail in the
EIR."10 6
The Forest Practice Rules, on the other hand, provide that the no-
tice of conformance filed with the plan need only "include a written re-
sponse of the Director to the significant environmental points raised
during the evaluation process." 10 7 Although the lead agency processing
an EIR must respond to each public comment made, in addition to sup-
porting its rationale for why it did or did not find the effects signifi-
cant, 08 the Director is not statutorily required to respond to the public
comments alleging significant environmental impact unless she deter-
mines that the environmental impact will be in fact significant. Nor is
she required to set forth the reasoning for her determination. Yet, unless
the Director responds to all alleged significant impacts on the environ-
ment, the Director fails to comply with the purpose of requiring the tim-
ber harvest plan and environmental impact reports-to provide the
public with sufficient information to ensure governmental accountabil-
ity. '0 9 This discrepancy gives the Director far greater discretion regard-
ing which public comments she wants to respond to and weakens the
ability of the public to hold government accountable.
II. CEQA Governs the Timber Harvest Plan
The Forest Practice Rules do not require that each significant envi-
ronmental point raised during the evaluation process be addressed in the
notice of conformance. 10 This limited requirement, as well as the inade-
quate notice and distribution of timber harvest plans, is inconsistent with
the clearly delineated requirements of CEQA" 1' and undermines the pur-
pose behind encouraging public involvement in the timber harvest plan
review process. 112
106. Id. § 15128 (1983).
107. Id. § 1037.8 (1986) ("The notice of conformance shall include a written response of
the Director to significant environmental points raised during the evaluation process.").
108. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
110. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit 14, § 1037.8 (1986).
111. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West 1986).
112. "The EIR process protects not only the environment but also informed self-govern-
ment." Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376,
392, 764 P.2d 278, 283, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 431 (1988). The EIR also is intended "to demon-
strate to an apprehensive citizenry that the agency has, in fact, analyzed and considered the
ecological implications of its action." No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 86,
529 P.2d 66, 78, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 46 (1974) ("One major purpose of an EIR is to inform
other government agencies and the public generally, of the environmental impact of a pro-
posed project." (citations omitted)). Because the EIR must be certified or rejected by public
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Unless the Director includes the reasons and the underlying ration-
ale for her failure to acknowledge public comments regarding the signifi-
cance of the environmental impact along with grounds for approval and
makes this information available with approval of the timber harvest
plan, the public may have only limited grounds upon which to base its
challenge.
A. The Statutory Interplay Between CEQA and the Act
Despite the exemption of licenses to harvest timber on private lands
in California from the EIR requirement and the existence of the separate
statutory authority and regulations applicable to the California Depart-
ment of Forestry and timber harvest plans, the Department still must
proceed within the statutory requirements of CEQA. 113
The California Appellate Court's holding in Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Arcata National Corp. 114 that implementation of the
FPA and CEQA be harmonized in order to achieve the goals of both' 15
was also required by the EIR Guidelines authorizing the timber harvest
plan.116 The judiciary also has required the Board of the California De-
partment of Forestry to harmonize CEQA with the FPA."17 The EIR
exemptions are permitted only if a project meets specific conditions that
ensure the project will meet the substantive goals of CEQA. Thus, while
timber harvest plan review is designed to be less time consuming than the
officials, it is a document of accountability. If CEQA is followed scrupulously, the public will
know the basis on which its responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally sig-
nificant action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to action with
which it disagrees. People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 842, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75
(1974); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15003(e) (1983). "The EIR is to demonstrate to an
apprehensive citizenry that the agency has, in fact, analyzed and considered the ecological
implications of its action." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15003(d) (1983).
113. The section 21080.5 exemption is not all-encompassing; rather, agencies are only ex-
empt from chapters 3 and 4 of CEQA relating to the EIR process. The rest of CEQA still
governs these exemptions. CAL. PUB. Ran. CODE § 21080.5(c) (West Supp. 1989); Environ-
mental Protection Information Center v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 604, 616-18, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 502, 509-11 (1985).
114. 59 Cal. App. 3d 959, 965, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1976).
115. Id.
116. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 1511 l(a)(1), (2), (3) & (b)(2) (1986) (setting forth pro-
cedures that "enable the lead agency to comply with both the permit statute and CEQA")
(emphasis added).
117. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15111 (1982); Environmental Protection Information
Center, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 512 ("While section 21080.5 may allow...
abbreviated project plans instead of full-blown EIRs, it does not except the industry from
adhering to the broad policy goals of CEQA . . . and to CEQA's substantive standards
designed to fulfill the act's goal of long-term preservation of a high-quality environment for the
citizens of Califorriia."); Gallegos v. Board of Forestry, 76 Cal. App. 3d 945, 952-54, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 86, 90-91 (1978).
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EIR process, the Department of Forestry and applicants to harvest tim-
ber on private lands in California have been required to comply with the
overall intent of CEQA.
The failure of the Forest Practice Rules to provide either for ade-
quate notice and distribution or for responses to all comments prevents
the Rules from meeting the conditions set forth in CEQA Guideline sec-
tion 15111. This provision was promulgated to address specifically how
projects requiring short time periods for approval can achieve simultane-
ously the goals of CEQA and subsidiary permit statutes such as a timber
harvest plan. 118 Although statutory interpretation traditionally holds
that an administrative agency is "entitled to deference when interpreting
policy in its field of expertise,"'1 19 and the Department of Forestry is ac-
corded deference in its interpretation of timber harvest plan implementa-
tion, the judiciary must ensure that the plans comply with the intent of
CEQA. 120 "Moreover, [courts] should construe every statute with refer-
ence to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may
be harmonized and retain effectiveness."' 12' The Forest Practice Rules
should be construed with reference to each of the conditions set forth in
the CEQA Guidelines to fulfill the exemption requirements as well as the
overall substantive intent of CEQA.
The California Supreme Court has not determined whether the
Guidelines are binding interpretations of CEQA. 122 Lower courts have
held, however, that at a minimum, the judiciary should afford great
weight to the Guidelines except when a provision is clearly "erroneous or
unauthorized" under CEQA. 123 When administrative rules or regula-
118. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15111 (1986), implements the statutory requirement of
CEQA that "[the guidelines shall specifically include criteria for public agencies to follow in
determining whether or not a proposed project may have a 'significant effect on the environ-
ment.' " CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21083 (West 1986). A subsidiary permit statute is a statu-
tory exemption to CEQA that has been approved by the Secretary of Resources as required in
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.5 (West Supp. 1989).
119. Norton v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 26 Cal. 3d 1, 29, 603 P.2d 1306, 1322,
160 Cal. Rptr. 710, 726 (1979); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Bd., 313 U.S. 177, 194
(1941) (an administrative agency is entitled to deference when interpreting policy in its field of
expertise).
120. "It is fundamental in statutory construction that courts should ascertain the intent of
the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." Clean Air Constituency v. Califor-
nia State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 801, 813-14, 523 P.2d 617, 624, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577,
584 (1974) (citing California Toll Bridge Auth. v. Kuchel, 40 Cal. 2d 43, 53, 251 P.2d 4, 9
(1952); Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 802, 151 P.2d 505, 508 (1944)).
121. Clean Air Constituency, 11 Cal. 3d at 814, 523 P.2d at 624-25, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 584-
85.
122. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d
376, 391 n.2, 764 P.2d 278, 282 n.2, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 430 n.2 (1988).
123. Rural Landowners Ass'n v. City Council, 143 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 1022, 192 Cal.
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tions "alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope" they "are
void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down
such regulations."' 124
Because the administrative rules1 25 established by the Board of the
California Department of Forestry do not provide for sufficient notice to
allow adequate public participation the Forest Practice Rules alter
CEQA and impair its scope. The judiciary must therefore strike down
the conflicting requirements and look to CEQA for the proper notice and
response requirements in processing the timber harvest plan. 126 It is
clear from the statutes as well as judicial interpretation that if traditional
statutory construction and analysis is applied to CEQA, the same analy-
sis should control timber harvest plan review. Current judicial interpre-
tation, however, is far from settled.
B. Judicial Interpretations Hold that the Timber Harvest Plan Exemption
is Governed by the Overall Intent of CEQA
The California Legislature enacted the FPA, the EIR exemption,
and Forest Practice Rules in response to various decisions by the judici-
ary. The trial court decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Arcata National Corp. 127 held that the timber harvest plan review pro-
cess is subject to CEQA.1 28 The Arcata129 opinion did not consider fully
Rptr. 325, 330 (1983) (citing City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove, 100 Cal. App. 3d
521, 530, 160 Cal. Rptr. 907, 911 (1979)).
124. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 748, 433 P.2d 697, 707, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 699
(1967) (regulations reducing Medi-Cal benefits violated enabling legislation and therefore were
void) (citing First Ind. Loan Co. v. Daugherty, 26 Cal. 2d 545, 550 (1945); Whitcomb Hotel v.
California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 753, 757 (1944); Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal.
148, 161-62 (1928); Hodge v. McCall, 185 Cal. 330, 334 (1921)). See also Environmental
Protection Information Center v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 604, 617, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502, 510
(1985):
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, exemptions specified in the
statute prevent additional exemptions from being implied or presumed, absent a clear
legislative intent to the contrary. [Citations omitted.] An examination of the specific
exemptions in the statutory scheme of CEQA reveals no legislative intent contra-
dicting that maxim, and if anything strengthens the maxim's applicability and the
conclusion that save for the exempted provisions, CEQA applies to the FPA and
Forestry Rules.
125. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 1037.7, 1037.8 (1986).
126. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text for the EIR notice and response
requirements.
127. 59 Cal. App. 3d 959, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1976).
128. TheArcata plaintiffs successfully brought a writ of mandate to compel the state for-
ester to set aside three timber harvest plans submitted without accompanying EIRs and to
obtain a judicial declaration that CEQA's EIR requirements apply to timber harvest plans.
Arcata, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 964, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
129. Iai at 973-77, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 180-83.
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the scope of CEQA's impact on the processing of timber harvest plans.
It did state, however, "we entertain no doubt that the two acts in ques-
tion are not in conflict, but rather supplement each other and, therefore,
must be harmonized." 130
The Secretary of Resources certified the timber harvest plan review
process as one that meets EIR exemption requirements on January 6,
1976.131 Neither the statutes nor the numerous cases that continue to
refer to the requirement that the two acts be implemented in concert 132
have clearly delineated the actual scope of the exemption. Likewise, the
exemption has never been fully considered in an appellate opinion.
Rather, California appellate courts have addressed this matter on a fact-
specific basis alone.
In Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Johnson 133
(EPIC), the First District Court of Appeal held that the timber harvest
plan exemption did not relieve the plan review process from demonstrat-
ing to the public a consideration of cumulative environmental effects that
would be caused by the proposed logging.1 34 The EPIC court reiterated
the Arcata 135 holding that CEQA applies to the timber harvest plan re-
view process to the extent it has not been exempted. With the exception
130. Id. at 965, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
131. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15251(a), (f) (1976). Pursuant to section 21080.5 of the
California Public Resources Code, timber operations subject to the FPA are provided a limited
exemption as a "certified regulatory program" from Chapters 3 and 4 (sections 21100-21155)
and section 21167 of CEQA. Chapters 3 and 4 specify the contents of an EIR, while section
21167 specifies the procedure for challenging environmental impact reports. Except for these
sections, all other provisions of CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines apply to certified programs
under section 21080.5, including timber harvest plan review. Environmental Protection Infor-
mation Center v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 604, 616, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502, 510-11 (1985).
132. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 80, 529 P.2d 66, 73-74, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 34, 41-42 (1974); Envirnonmental Protection Information Center, 170 Cal. App. 3d at
614-16, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09; Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, 106 Cal. App. 3d
988, 1000, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514, 521 (1980); Gallegos v. Board of Forestry, 76 Cal. App. 3d 945,
952-54, 142 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90-92 (1978).
133. 170 Cal. App. 3d at 604, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
134. Id. at 625, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 516. The EPIC plaintiffs filed a writ of mandate to set
aside an approved timber harvest plan that had failed to consider the cumulative impact of
foresting a 75-acre grove of old-growth redwoods containing a Native American archaelogical
site. The EPIC court held that the timber harvest plan exemption is not a "blanket exemp-
tion" from CEQA, id. at 616, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 509, and that it is a prejudicial abuse of
discretion to fail to have a window of 10 days from the date of approval before a notice of
approval that includes a response to significant environmental points is made available to the
public, CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 1037.8 (1983). Environmental Protection Information
Center, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 624, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
135. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App. 3d 959,
976, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172, 183 (1976).
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of asserting that the CEQA Guidelines govern consideration of cumula-
tive impact, 136 the court did not further clarify this issue.
The Sixth District Court of Appeal, in Laupheimer v. State, 137 re-
jected EPIC's holding that the CEQA Guidelines governing cumulative
impact apply to the timber harvest plan and held that the CEQA Guide-
lines have limited application to the timber harvest plan review process.
The Laupheimer court held that timber harvest plan review is governed
by the rules of the Board of Forestry, 138 and while "cumulative impact"
issues raised during the review process must be considered, 139 the consid-
eration does not need to be of the detailed nature suggested by the EPIC
court. The Laupheimer court did not go so far, however, as to say that
the logging industry is exempt from the broad environmental concerns
expressed in CEQA. 14°
With respect to the requirements of an adequate timber harvest
plan, the First District's decision in EPIC and the Sixth District's deci-
sion in Laupheimer arrive at completely different results. Given that the
California Supreme Court has declined to consider the issue, 141 litigants
attempting to protect the environment through similar litigation should
carefully hone their arguments to avoid the Laupheimer result.
I. Timber Harvest Plan Review Procedures and the Due
Process Right To Be Free from Arbitrary Adjudicative
Procedures
When a person is deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, such as
the right to have public comments addressed before a timber harvest plan
is certified or the requirement that the Director give detailed considera-
tion to the cumulative impact of cutting old-growth forest, California
136. Environmental Protection Information Center, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 625, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 516 ("Since CEQA applies to the THP evaluation and approval process, it follows
that CDF... [is] required by law.., to consider the impact of cumulative effects .... The
failure to consider cumulative impact was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.").
137. 200 Cal. App. 3d 440, 246 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1988).
138. Laupheimer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 85; see CAL. ADMiN. CODE
tit. 14, §§ 895-1112 (1989) for the Forest Practice Rules.
139. Laupheimer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 466, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (the Department of For-
estry need only "have looked for and . . . assessed potential cumulative environmental
effects").
140. Id. at 462, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (The Department of Forestry "must consider each
timber harvesting plan in its full environmental context and not in a vacuum.., the impor-
tance of seeing the entire environmental picture is unaffected by labels developed under
CEQA. The relevant question will be whether, in a given case, Forestry has adequately con-
sidered the entire relevant environmental picture.").
141. Id at 440, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (review denied Jun. 29, 1988).
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constitutional due process analysis must start with an assessment of what
procedural protections are mandated in light of the governmental and
private interests at stake. 142 The due process safeguards required for pro-
tection of an individual's statutory interests must be analyzed in the con-
text of the principle established in People v. Ramirez 143 that "freedom
from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of one's
liberty."144
The procedures followed by the Board of Forestry in the timber har-
vest plan review process 145 fail to satisfy this basic requirement of due
process. These rules do not provide the public with an opportunity to
respond to the grounds for the timber harvest plan approval before a final
decision. 146 The Ramirez court requires that before a final decision is
made the person(s) whose liberty interest in freedom from arbitrary adju-
dicative procedures 147 is at stake must be given a statement of the
grounds for the decision, access to the information considered in reach-
ing the decision, notice of the right to respond, and an opportunity to
respond if he or she elects to do so. A judicial hearing that may be ob-
142. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 264, 599 P.2d 622, 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 318
(1979). Ramirez was convicted of a drug offense and committed as an outpatient for treat-
ment. Two years after his drug conviction he was arrested for disturbing the peace and re-
sisting arrest. Ramirez pleaded guilty to the first charge and the second was dropped. Because
the Director of Corrections found Ramirez was "not a fit subject for confinement or treat-
ment" in the center, the defendant's commitment for treatment was terminated and criminal
proceedings on the drug offense were resumed. The California Supreme Court held that due
process entitles a patient-inmate of a California Rehabilitation Center an opportunity to re-
spond to an exclusion prior to a final exclusion decision. The court based its analysis on the
due process clause of the California Constitution (article I, sections 7(a) and 15) and held that
application of the clauses must be determined "in a context of the individual's due process
liberty interest in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures." Thus, when a person is
deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, due process analysis must start "with an assessment
of what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and
private interests at stake." Id. at 268, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
143. 25 Cal. 3d 260, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1979). See also Rabin, Job Security
and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV 60, 77, 79 (1976) (advocating a "right to a reasoned explanation of government
conduct that is contrary to the expectations the government has created by conferring a special
status on an individual"); Van Alstyne, Crack in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Pro-
cess in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 487 (1977) (advocating "freedom
from arbitrary adjudicative procedures" as an element of liberty).
144. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
145. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 1053-1059 (1985).
146. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 1037.8 provides for the Director to delay notifying the
public of timber harvest plan approval for ten days from the date of approval.
147. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320; San Jose Police
Officers Ass'n v. San Jose, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1471, 1478-79, 245 Cal. Rptr. 728, 731-32 (1988).
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tained only after timber harvest plan approval1 48 is too late to prevent the
deprivation of the public's interest in protection of environmental values.
Thus, current implementation of the Forest Practice Rules deprives the
public of its procedural as well as substantive right to freedom from arbi-
trary adjudicative procedures.
The critical failure of due process in the current review procedure
employed by the Department of Forestry is that logging may commence
after a timber harvest plan is approved, but before the public is aware of
the grounds for approval. This flawed process impedes the public's ac-
cess to judicial review of the Department's decision. To satisfy the con-
stitutional requirements of due process, the Department of Forestry must
prohibit the commencement of logging under an approved timber harvest
plan until a notice of conformance has been issued informing the public
of the grounds for approval and allowing the public time to challenge the
decision. 149 This procedure will allow the public to seek a judicial hear-
ing to preserve its rights and does not entail additional fiscal or adminis-
trative burdens. At a minimum, the grounds for approval must be made
available at the time of approval and before timber harvesting may
commence.
A. What Procedural Protections are Constitutionally Required?
The California Constitution requires that persons who have a funda-
mental right, significant interest, or expectancy interest in a statutorily
created benefit be provided procedural due process before they are de-
prived of that right or interest. 150 Although the procedural protections
vary depending on the interest, each of the interests requires procedural
due process.
(1) Fundamental Right
The California Constitution,151 coupled with CEQA's express legis-
lative intent to encourage public involvement at every stage- of the review
process, 152 may give California citizens a fundamental interest in 153 pro-
148. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 4514.5 (West 1984) (alerts persons to their right to com-
mence an action for writ of mandate).
149. Cf CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 1037.8 (1986). The notice of conformance cur-
rently requires only that the Director include a written response to "significant environmental
points raised during the evaluation process."
150. See infra notes 151-88 and accompanying text.
151. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 7(a), 15.
152. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
153. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 268, 599 P.2d 622, 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320
(1979) (granting the public a substantive right to freedom from arbitrary adjudicative proce-
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tecting the environment from destructive timber harvesting.1 54 Legisla-
tive recognition of this fundamental interest is embodied in the legislative
findings of CEQA.1 55 This interest is also recognized in the Z'berg-
Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973.156 When there is a fundamental
right, no allegation of "beneficial interest" is necessary in order to en-
force a statutory duty or public right.1 57 Hence, a fundamental right is
dures). CEQA acknowledges the public's fundamental interest in protection of environmental
values. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 1986).
154. Environmental Protection Information Center v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 602, 623,
216 Cal. Rptr. 502, 514 (1985); Gallegos v. State Bd. of Forestry, 76 Cal. App. 3d 945, 950,
142 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88-89 (1978).
155. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 1986):
(a) The maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state now and in
the future is a matter of statewide concern.
(b) It is necessary to provide a high-quality environment that at all times is healthful
and pleasing to the senses and intellect of man.
(c) There is a need to understand the relationship between the maintenance of high-
quality ecological systems and the general welfare of the people of the state, including
their enjoyment of the natural resources of the state.
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state government which
regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are
found to affect the quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that
major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage, while providing a
decent home and satisfying living environment for every Californian.
156. Id. § 4512:
(b) The Legislature further finds and declares that the forest resources and timber-
lands of the state furnish high-quality timber, recreational opportunities, and aes-
thetic enjoyment while providing watershed protection and maintaining fisheries and
wildlife.
(c) The Legislature thus declares that it is the policy of this state to encourage pru-
dent and responsible forest resource management calculated to serve the public's
need for timber and other forest products, while giving consideration to the public's
need for watershed protection, fisheries and wildlife, and recreational opportunities
alike in this and future generations.
See also Sierra Club v. California Coastal Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 149, 155,
129 Cal. Rptr. 743, 747 (1976) (policy statement of California Coastal Zone Conservation Act
established fundamental right in public that the coastal zone will be preserved and maintained
in its present state).
157. Green v. Obledo, 29 Cal. 3d 126, 144, 624 P.2d 256, 266, 172 Cal. Rptr. 206, 216,
(1981) (quoting Board of Social Welfare v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 98, 100-01, 162
P.2d 627, 628-29 (1945) (citations omitted)):
"[W]here the question is one of public right and the object ... is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the relator, need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in
having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced" . . . . The exception
promotes the policy of guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to ensure that no gov-
ernmental body impairs or defeats the purpose of legislation establishing a public
right.
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sufficient to require due process of law before the person who is holding
such a right is deprived of his interest in it.
(2) Significant Interest
Even if the courts fail to recognize the "fundamental right" of the
public, the fact that the public has a "significant interest" in being free
from "arbitrary adjudicative procedures" 158 accords it due process
rights. California judicial interpretation of "significant interest" is va-
ried. 159 Adjudicatory decisions by state agencies that threaten to impair
a significant interest are subject to the due process clauses and require-
ments of both the United States and California Constitutions.1 60 The
government may not deprive its citizens of a significant interest without
adequate notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposed decision
before such deprivation takes place.1 61
(3) Laupheimer and Due Process
In a recent case, Laupheimer v. State,162 homeowners, joined by a
county and water district, challenged two timber harvest plans that had
been approved by the Department of Forestry. The plaintiffs argued that
the plans were illegal because the Forest Practice Act and its Rules vio-
late the Federal and California constitutions and CEQA.1 63 Although
the Laupheimer decision takes a very restrictive view of the public's
rights under the Forest Practices Act, it leaves open a slight possibility
158. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 268, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320-21 (1979).
159. 4 significant interest has been found in the state's right to protect gravely ill children
whose patents refuse treatment for them on religious grounds, Walker v. People, 47 Cal. 3d
112, 141, 763 P.2d 852, 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 20 (1988); a defendant's right to have faith in
her court appointed counsel, People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 860, 760 P.2d 423, 435, 251
Cal. Rptr. 227, 239 (1988); the public interest in promoting the efficient administration of
justice by discouraging baseless lawsuits, City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 531,
645 P.2d 137, 139, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (1982); an employer's interest in protecting its unem-
ployment insurance reserve account from erroneous charges, Interstate Brands v. Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appeals Bd., 26 Cal. 3d 770, 608 P.2d 707, 163 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1980); a person's
opportunity to be heard prior to the removal of statutorily provided benefits, People v. Rami-
rez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 265, 599 P.2d 622, 624-25, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 318-19 (1979); and the
public's interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced, Woodland Hills Residents
Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 935-36, 593 P.2d 200, 209-10, 154
Cal. Rptr. 503, 512-13 (1978).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 7, 15; People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal.
3d 260, 265, 599 P.2d 622, 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (1979); Horn v. County of Ventura, 24
Cal. 3d 605, 616, 596 P.2d 1134, 1140, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 724 (1979).
161. Ramirez 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320 ("freedom from
arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of one's liberty").
162. 200 Cal. App. 3d 440, 447, 246 Cal. Rptr. 82, 83 (1988).
163. Id. at 448, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
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that a petitioner may make a factual showing that her due process rights
have been violated in the approval of a timber harvest plan. The
Laupheimer court said, "[a] directly affected member of the public might
well be able, in the circumstances of a given case, to demonstrate that he
or she had been denied procedural due process notwithstanding full com-
pliance with all applicable statutes and regulations."' 64 To the extent
that Laupheimer may be read to suggest that members of the public have
no interest requiring due process protection, it is inconsistent with Cali-
fornia law.
The Laupheimer court's reliance upon Mathews v. Eldridge 165 illus-
trates that the court, in ignoring California Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, placed too much emphasis on federal constitutional law. In
Mathews, the United States Supreme Court established a three-part bal-
ancing test to determine whether a hearing is required before a person's
interest may be deprived.166 The test involves weighing the importance
of the "private interest that will be affected by the official action" and the
value of specific procedural safeguards to protect that interest against the
governmental interest in fiscal and administrative efficiency.' 67 The
Laupheimer court held that because the Department of Forestry "has as
a practical matter the power to convene a public hearing, on adequate
notice to all apparently affected persons, whenever appropriate,"' 168 con-
sideration of whether the Act and the Forest Practice Rules are defective
in protecting the public's due process rights to predeprivation notice is
abstract and need not be assessed. The court glossed over the procedural
due process issue by terming it abstract and therefore unidentifiable. The
court concluded that because a public hearing could be held, at the Di-
rector's discretion, sufficient due process protection is provided. The
Laupheimer court failed, however, to mention the Ramirez due process
test. 169 In light of the fact that the Ramirez due process approach serves
to further refine California constitutional guarantees and provides greater
protections than those available under the United States Constitution,
the Laupheimer court failed to apply the relevant approach in California.
164. Id. at 456, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 89. "We conclude only that the Act and Rules establish
procedures which are adequate, as a matter of procedural due process in the abstract context in
which appellants have chosen to attack them." Id. at 457, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
165. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security benefits are statutorily created property that may
not be taken without an opportunity to be heard).
166. Id. at 334-35.
167. Id.
168. Laupheimer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 457, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
169. See supra note 142.
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The United States Constitution sets forth the minimal requirements
a state must meet. 170 California procedural due process jurisprudence
differs from and expands upon federal due process analysis. The applica-
tion of the due process clause of the California Constitution1 71 must be
determined in the context of the individual's interest in freedom from
arbitrary adjudicative procedures. 172 The Ramirez approach expands
upon Mathews and federal due process jurisprudence by requiring courts
to "evaluate the extent to which procedural protections can be tailored to
promote more accurate and reliable administrative decisions in light of
the governmental and private interests at stake."1 73 The analytical ap-
proach set forth in Ramirez guides state due process analysis and re-
quires that the California Department of Forestry tailor its rules to
provide adequate opportunity for public response to the Department of
Forestry's proposed timber harvest plan decisions and the grounds for
them prior to timber harvest plan approval.
The Laupheimer court not only failed to apply the appropriate Cali-
fornia constitutional analysis, but it also wrongly applied the United
States analytical approach. Even if the Mathews test were the proper
analysis, because the procedures held constitutional in Mathews1 74 al-
lowed for welfare recipients to respond to a proposed termination of ben-
efits prior to the termination decision, the Laupheimer court should have
required the Department to have provided the public with the grounds
for its decision before commencement of timber harvesting. The Depart-
ment's current procedures fail to meet even this minimal standard of due
process.
B. The State Must Provide Substantial Evidence of Grounds for Depriving
the Public of Their Interest
The current procedural approach to authorizing timber harvest
plans permits logging to commence immediately upon approval and
before the public has been informed of the grounds for approval. This
approach violates state and federal due process. In order to satisfy the
170. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1979) (citing Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 368 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)) (A state may "exercise its ... sovereign right to adopt in its own
constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution.").
171. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7(a) ("A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws"), § 15 ("Persons may not
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.").
172. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 268, 599 P.2d 622, 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320
(1979).
173. Id. at 267, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
174. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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constitutional requirements of due process of law, the Department of
Forestry must issue a notice of conformance that informs the public of
the grounds for approval before logging is permitted to commence. This
procedure would allow the public time to seek a judicial hearing to pre-
serve their rights and does not entail additional fiscal or administrative
burdens.
As held in EPIC and reiterated in Laupheimer, the timber harvest
plan is within the scope of CEQA. CEQA requires that a conclusion be
supported by substantial evidence made explicit in the record.1 75 The
requirement that state and local agencies provide substantial evidence to
support their denial of benefits is common to statutory constructs. In
Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations
Board, 176 an agricultural employer challenged as unconstitutional the
statutorily prescribed "substantial evidence" standard of review of Agri-
cultural Labor Relations Board decisions.' 77 The California Supreme
Court held that the Agricultural Labor Relations Act and the substantial
evidence standard were constitutional precisely because the provisions
for adequate notice and evidentiary hearings before the Agricultural La-
bor Relations Board guaranteed procedural due process.1 78
The California Department of Forestry is a statewide agency, whose
procedural requirements are similar to those provided by the Agricul-
tural Labor Relations Board including "notice, written pleadings, eviden-
tiary hearings . . .and a requirement that orders be accompanied by
findings based on the preponderance of the reported evidence."1 79
Hence, even if the timber harvest plan were beyond the scope of CEQA,
175. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15384(a) (1986) ("substantial evidence ... means
enough relevant information and reasonable information. . . that a fair argument can be made
to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached"). See also CAL.
PUB. REs. CODE § 21083 (West 1986) (directing the Office of Planning and Research (OPR) to
develop guidelines with objectives and criteria for orderly evaluation of projects), and § 21087
(OPR shall review these guidelines periodically and propose changes or amendments).
176. 24 Cal. 3d 335, 595 P.2d 579, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979).
177. As the court stated: "[A] statute might pass constitutional muster if it were to: (1)
provide for judicial review of fact findings only by the standard whether they are supported by
substantial evidence in the light of the whole record, and (2) guarantee administrative due
process." Id. at 344, 595 P.2d at 584, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
178. "We therefore hold that the Legislature may accord finality to the findings of a state-
wide agency that are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole
and are made under safeguards equivalent to those provided by the ALRA for unfair labor
practice proceedings ...." Id. at 346, 595 P.2d at 585, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
179. Id. at 345, 595 P.2d at 584, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 6; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 895-
1112 (1989); for the ALR.A requirement, see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1160.2, 1160.3 (West 1986);
see also notes 81-109 and accompanying text.
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the notice of conformance still would have to be supported by substantial
evidence in the record under a typical statutorily created benefit analysis.
The timber harvest plan is within the scope of CEQA, however; and
the CEQA Guidelines that require an agency's approval of an EIR to "be
supported by substantial evidence in the record" 180 also apply to timber
harvest plans. The Guidelines define the standard for "substantial evi-
dence" as "enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from
this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclu-
sion .... Mere uncorroborated opinion or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence."181 Because the California Department of Forestry
procedures do not meet this standard, the failure to use the substantial
evidence test in judicial review of the Department of Forestry findings is
unconstitutional. To make these procedures constitutional the substan-
tial evidence test must be applied.
Even if the public's interest in a "quality environment"18 2 is deemed
a mere expectancy (and not a significant interest as suggested above),
California jurisprudence requires a response to all public comments
before a timber harvest plan is granted. In Saleeby v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia 1 8 3 the California Supreme Court applied the Ramirez184 approach
in a case brought by an aggrieved client who petitioned the State Bar
Security Fund for reimbursement for monies paid to counsel who pro-
vided ineffective and inadequate assistance. The petitioner was denied
reimbursement without a hearing. In the client's challenge to the State
Bar Rules, the California Supreme Court found that under the Bar's
rules "[a]n applicant is entitled to present information in support of his
claim at the time he makes his request, but he is not entitled to any fur-
ther information until the Bar makes its final decision."18 5 The court
held that such procedures violated basic due process although it con-
strued the petitioner's interest as akin to an "expectancy" rather than a
"right."18 6 The Court further noted that California has "expanded upon
the federal analytical base [of due process] by focusing on the administra-
180. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376,
407, 764 P.2d 278, 293, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 441 (1988); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15091(b)
(1986).
181. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15384(a) (1986).
182. CAL. PUB. R-s. CODE § 21000(a) (West 1986).
183. 39 Cal. 3d 547, 702 P.2d 525, 216 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1985).
184. 25 Cal. 3d 260, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1979).
185. 39 Cal. 3d at 566, 702 P.2d at 535, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 378. This description applies to
the Board's current administrative procedures, whereby petitioner and others may comment
on the timber harvest plans submitted by timber companies, but are not allowed to respond to
the Board's proposed decision and the grounds for it.
186. Id.
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tive process itself."'18 7 The court concluded that the Bar's procedures
must at a minimum "give petitioner and other applicants an opportunity
to respond to the Bar's proposed disposition of the request for reimburse-
ment" and "afford applicants a reasonable opportunity to raise objections
to the particular action the Bar desires to take."188
Because the public's interest in the protection of environmental val-
ues from the harvest of timber is at least as great as a mere expectancy,
procedural due process protection must be granted.
IV. The Road to Reform
There are a number of steps the California Legislature can and
should undertake to reform the vague language regarding the EIR ex-
emption. First, the California Legislature should amend the Guide-
lines 8 9 to provide for delivery of the notice of conformance to the timber
harvest applicant concurrently with the Board's responses to public com-
ments. This procedure would allow the public to know the grounds for
approval before trees may be cut and will provide an opportunity to ob-
tain judicial review before timber harvesting and irreparable harm to the
environment takes place.
Second, the legislature should amend section 1037.8 of the Califor-
nia Administrative Code to require the Director of Forestry to indicate
"reasons for determining that various effects of a project are not substan-
tial and consequently have not been discussed in detail."1 90 This change
also would inform the public of the basis for the Director's decision at
the time the applicant commences lumbering. The Code also should pro-
vide for a waiting period from the date a plan is approved and the time
action on the plan may commence, during which the Director's re-
sponses may be distributed.
Third, the legislature should require periodic recertification of Cali-
fornia Department of Forestry's regulatory program to ensure that the
timber harvest plan review process continues to meet the EIR exemption
requirements set forth in section 21080.5 of the California Public Re-
sources Code. 19' There is an extremely short statute of limitations for
objections to the Secretary's certification finding. 9 2 If the circumstances
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 1037.7, 1037.8 (1986).
190. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West 1986).
191. There is a thirty-day statute of limitations on challenges to the Secretary's certifica-
tion of exempt programs. Id. § 21080.5(g)-(h) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
192. Id. § 21080.5(f) (West Supp. 1989).
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of timber harvesting in place today 93 existed at the time the Secretary
certified the timber harvest plan review process, it is questionable
whether the Secretary would have certified the program. Thus, the Sec-
retary should review again the timber harvest plan process and possibly
establish a balancing test .to determine whether timber harvest plan re-
view considers cumulative effects in sufficient depth to meet CEQA re-
quirements. A balancing test might weigh the policy of promoting the
productivity of timberlands with a thorough consideration of the cumu-
latiVe environmental impact of their harvest.
Finally, if the legislature fails to amend these statutes to delineate
more clearly the requirements and provide due process to the public, the
California Supreme Court should accept this matter for review. The
supreme court, in its analysis of the situation, should require that "all
action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental
quality of the state"194 apply to timber harvest plan preparation and re-
view and that the public be ensured grounds upon which to challenge
approval of a timber harvest plan by requiring substantial evidence in the
record to support the grounds for approval.
Conclusion
Currently, CEQA is the most viable vehicle for relief from environ-
mental pillage in California. The legislative intent of CEQA is to main-
tain a quality environment by making the "long-term protection of the
environment.., the guiding criterion in public decisions."1 95
Despite the timber harvest plan exemption from the EIR require-
ment, the statutes and cases agree that the timber industry still must
comport with CEQA and the EIR Guidelines. Because the timber har-
vest plan must be construed within CEQA's framework, the CEQA re-
quirement that the public be involved at every stage of the review and
determination process also applies to the timber harvest plan.
The people of California have a constitutional liberty interest in free-
dom from arbitrary adjudication 96 of statutorily created rights. To sat-
isfy the constitutional due process requirements, the Department of
Forestry must not permit logging to commence under an approved tim-
ber harvest plan until a notice of conformance that informs the public of
the grounds for approval has been issued. In the alternative, the legisla-
193. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
194. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21001(a) (West 1986).
195. Id § 21001(d).
196. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 268, 599 P.2d 622, 625, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320
(1979).
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ture should amend section 1037.8 of the California Administrative Code
to require the Director of Forestry to indicate "reasons for determining
that various effects of a project are not substantial and consequently have
not been discussed in detail." 197 In addition, the legislature should re-
view the Secretary of Resources finding that the timber harvest plan
meets the EIR exemption requirements as laid out in section 21080.5 of
the California Public Resources Code. 198 Finally, if the legislature fails
to amend these statutes to more clearly delineate their requirements and
provide due process to the public, the California Supreme Court should
accept this matter for review.
197. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 1986).
198. Id. § 21080.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
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